The relationship between legal tradition and competition policy is a multidimensional and complex one. 
Introduction
The two decades beginning from the early 1980s witnessed significant institutional changes in many economies in the world.
Socialist countries in East Europe and Central Asia underwent political transformation to democracies and embraced the market system.
Other socialist countries that did not undergo political transformation such as China and Vietnam began using market mechanisms selectively to enhance their economic performance. At the same time, countries that have already adopted the market system undertook to give market forces even greater role in their economies by divesting state owned enterprises via large-scale privatization.
Economists have also become more interested in the role of institutions to economic growth and development. In the context of institutional changes that have taken place, economists are pondering over the type of institutions such as property right protection that should be considered to be essential for the proper functioning of market economies.
However, the questions are not just about market institutions but of state interventions that are required to address problems of market failures. One such intervention is competition policy.
Today, more than a hundred countries around the world have implemented national competition laws 1 . There is sufficient theoretical and empirical support to motivate the implementation of competition policy.
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What is debatable, especially from the view point of developing countries, is the form and timing of implementation i.e. whether multilateral competition rules are useful and whether more exemptions ought to be allowed for conflicting industrial policies. This paper attempts to further analyze the importance of one such country-specific characteristic, namely legal tradition, in the implementation of competition law. The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the major legal traditions in the world. Section 3 summarizes the empirical literature on legal traditions and their impact on economic 1 The exact number is difficult to determine. UNCTAD (2003) lists countries with competition law. 2 See UNCTAD (1997) . 3 See for example Ajit Singh's (2002) arguments. Structural adjustment requirements including competition law enactments and reforms have not been useful in persuading developing countries to implement competition law.
growth and development.
Section 4 examines the relationship between legal tradition and competition policy. Section 5 concludes.
Legal Traditions and Economic Development

Definitions
A legal system refers to an operating set of legal institutions, procedures, and rules. 4 Legal systems can be grouped into different families based on cultural dimensions:
"A legal tradition … is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught." David and Brierley (1985) list at least three types of major legal tradition (or legal family), namely, the Romano-Germanic (Civil) law, Common law and Socialist law. Others include Talmudic, Islamic, Hindu, and Asian legal traditions. There are some differences within some legal traditions that require further reclassification. For example, within the Romano-Germanic legal tradition, scholars distinguish between the French, German and Nordic (Scandinavian)
Types of Legal Traditions
Civil law traditions. The French civil law is regarded to be more distrustful of judges (the Napoleonic code) and hence put more emphasis on judicial formalism compared to the German civil law.
4 Merryman (1985) ,p.1. 5 Ibid, p.2. 
Differences Between Legal Traditions:
A Civil Law vs. Common Law Example
The differences between legal traditions can be illustrated by comparing two major legal traditions namely, the civil law tradition and the common law tradition. The most salient differences are in the independence of the judiciary (from the state), the professional status of judges, their role in the trial process, the use of juries, legal instruction and records, and the importance of precedence and appeal. Table 2 summarizes some of these differences between the two legal traditions.
The judiciary in the civil law is generally considered to be less independent from the state compared to the common law. Judges in the civil law system follow a specific career track that culminates in their appointment by the state. In contrast, common law judges are appointed from the community of practicing lawyers. Juries are also more often used in common law than in civil law. The function of prosecution and judgement are combined in civil law whereas the two functions are separated in common law. The combination of prosecution and judgement in civil law also means that judges in a civil law system assume an inquisitorial role -undertaking the investigative part of the prosecution process. In contrast, lawyers and judges assume adversarial roles -lawyers undertake investigations, collect evidence and present their case before the judge (and jury). Legal codes also play a more important role in civil law -the judge's role is to faithfully apply the existing statutory law and render a judgement that is narrowly consistent with it. In contrast, the law is fashioned in terms of broad legal principles in common law. Here judges interpret in the best manner possible the "spirit" of the law. This allows common law judges to "make" laws by setting precedents (stare decisis) that are considered to be important interpretation of the law for subsequent and related cases.
It is hence not surprising that appeal or re-litigation is an important process in a relatively "open" legal system such as the common law.
The Impact of Legal Tradition on Economic Development
The examination of legal tradition as an important factor in economic development received recent attention in the empirical studies of comparative institutional economics.
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In this section we review the evidence from such studies. This is done to give us some idea about the significance of the legal tradition as a factor in economic development before we propose and test a similar role in competition policy.
Legal Tradition and Finance
The recent work on the impact of legal tradition on the economic development comes from the investigations on the relationship between law, financial development and economic growth. This approach, dubbed the "Law and Finance Theory" builds on the basic empirical evidence that financial development has a first-order 6 For a succinct summary of the literature, see also Shirley (2003) .
impact on economic growth.
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The theory attempts to uncover the determinants of financial development 8 . The theory argues that the international differences in financial development can be explained by differences in legal institutions (system, tradition).
Beck and Levine (2003) There are two components in the law and finance theory (see Figure   1 ). Firstly, legal traditions have significant impact on the effective protection of private property rights such as enforcement of private contract agreement and investor protection.
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Secondly, the protection of private property rights contributes towards financial development. Essentially, the protection of private property rights provides confidence to savers, lenders and investors to participate in the financial markets.
7 See Levine and Zervos (1998) , Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Kunt and Levine (2001) . 8 See La Porta et al (1997 Porta et al ( ,1998 Not surprisingly, the subsequent debates on the validity of the findings of the law and finance theory have focused on the two set of linkages: (i) between legal tradition and basic market institutions, and (ii) between basic market institutions and financial development.
Even though the proponents of the law and finance theory have described research in this area as on-going, the accumulated evidence in favour of the theory is fairly impressive. 
Legal Tradition, Regulation and Court
Proponents of the law and finance theory have also extended their work to encompass regulation and courts. 12 Two recent examples include Djankov et al (2002) and Djankov et al (2003) . Djankov et al (2002) uses data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries to examine the determinants of the cost of entry. They find that civil law countries (with the exception of Scandinavian 11 Time constraint prevents an adequate treatment of the subject here. Beck and Levine (2003) review the evidence from both proponents and critics of the law and finance theory. 12 There is a difference between regulation and courts. Regulation restricts private conduct while the court resolves disputes. See Djankov et al (2003), p.453-454. countries) tend to regulate entry more heavily compared to common law countries. Interestingly, the authors did not find any correlation between legal tradition and political factors such as executive de facto independence, constraints on executive power, effectiveness legislature, competition nominating, autocracy and political rights.
13 Djankov et al (2003) measured the procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and collection of bounced check and used these data to construct an index of procedural formalism for 109 countries. 14 Their intention is to study the effectiveness of courts as mechanisms of dispute resolution.
The authors find that civil law countries tend to exhibit higher formalism in adjudication compared to common law countries.
Higher formalism is also associated with lower enforceability of contracts, higher corruption, lower honesty, lower consistency, and a less fair legal system.
Legal Origin and Legal Transplant
The next natural step after uncovering the indirect influence of legal traditions on financial and economic development would of course be the explanation of the choice of legal systems. Economists have applied the rational choice framework to understand the problem of legal origins. The explanation thus far has been a rational and political one -the adoption of a given legal system is understood to be "optimal" or "efficient" outcome given the adoptee country's political circumstances. 13 The exception is the socialist legal tradition which showed correlation with autocracy (positive) and political rights (negative). 14 The authors define procedural formalism as the ways in which the law regulate the operation of courts. These include the use of lawyers and professional judges, litigation procedures etc. See Djankov et al (2003) , p.455. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) , for example, argue that the original choice of a given legal system by a country is an outcome of the political situation in that country in which these laws originated.
More specifically, a country would "choose" a legal system that is most efficient given the balance of power between the King and the nobility. The influence of local nobles vis-à-vis the King was greater in France than in England (a dictator-controlled country). Hence, local magnates in France preferred civil law -in which the judges are state-controlled -because they feared independent juries (as in common law) would be compromised by other local interests. The situation in England was the reverse -a dictatorial King required independent judges that may reduce the biasness of the courts towards the royals. Hence, the community engaged in a "Coasian bargain" (i.e. the Magna Carta) whereby the community and the King agree on cash transfer needed to support the efficient outcome i.e.
choice of legal system.
The choice of legal systems by other transplant or "non-origin" countries is also an interesting problem.
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There are significantly more countries to consider and the story is complex. Legal codes have been transplanted to the rest of the world via a variety of mechanisms such as through conquest, colonialization and imitation.
The economic inquiry into the question of legal transplant has thus far focussed on the impact of the type (i.e. legal tradition) and process of legal transplant on economic development.
With regards to legal tradition, Berkowitz et al (2003) found empirical evidence that the impact of transplanting a particular legal tradition on economic development is not robust to different legality 15 The origin countries include England, France and Germany.
measures. 16 Furthermore, the overall impact of the transplanting process (via its impact on legality) is stronger than the impact of transplanting a particular legal tradition.
The policy implications that the authors draw from their work are also worth quoting in full:
17 "The policy implications of these results are fundamental: a legal reform strategy should aim at improving legality by carefully choosing legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is appreciated by domestic law makers, law enforcers and economic agents, who are the final consumers of these rules. In short, legal reform must ensure that there is a domestic demand for the new law, and that supply can match demand … a cautious suggestion would be that legal borrowing should take place either from a country with a similar legal heritage, or substantial investment should be made in legal information and training prior to adoption of a law, so that domestic agents can enhance their familiarity with the imported law and make an informed decision about how to adapt the law to local conditions."
The above recommendations suggest that the transplant of law requires careful considerations that extend beyond mere adoption of legal rules and principles from other countries.
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In particular, the importance of "legality" provides some clues on how to improve the transplant process. We take these insights to motivate our 16 Legality measures include efficiency of judiciary, rule of law, absence of corruption, risk of appropriation and risk of contract repudiation. (Berkowitz et al (2003) , p.182). 17 Ibid, p.192. 18 Readers interested to explore this issue should also look at Pistor et al (2003) .
investigations into the importance of legal tradition for the implementation and enforcement of competition policy.
Legal Tradition and the New Comparative Economics
The literature on comparative institutional economics in which legal tradition is included as an important variable has evolved towards discovering the political determinants of institutional choice (including legal origin). In Djankov et al (2003a) , the label of "new comparative economics" is used to describe a framework of analysis The characterization of the trade-off between disorder and dictatorship also receives some attention in Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) . In their paper paper, they differentiate between two types of institutions: "contracting institutions" that supports private contracts (which would include private ordering) and "property rights institutions" that constrain government and elite expropriation. Legal tradition is considered to be a proxy for contracting institutions (via justification by way of reference to Djankov et al (2002) and Djankov et al (2003) The reference to Montesquieu also leads us to another important aspect of institutional choice, namely, the separation of powers between legislature (parliament), executive and judiciary (courts).
This is necessary to ensure that the power of the State does not fall into one person or a small group in society.
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What is the relationship between separation of powers and legal tradition? The work of Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) certainly suggest that the two is related. For example, the judiciary in a civil law system -by virtue of being an extension of the executive -has less separation of powers than in common law system.
Legal Tradition and Competition Policy
To date, around 86 countries have implemented competition law. between 1990 and 2003 (see Table 3 ). The implementation of competition laws are fairly evenly distributed across the different legal traditions.
Based on the distinctions that legal scholars draw between the different traditions as well as from the evidence gathered by the law and finance theorists, it is plausible that legal traditions does have some impacts on the implementation of competition policy. Precise what forms do these of impacts take require some further thought.
In this matter we draw some clues from existing empirical work related to competition policy and from the law and finance theory.
Cross-Country Empirical Work on Competition Policy
Cross-country and econometric-based studies on competition policy have thus far been fairly diverse focusing on issues such as the reason for and impact of implementation of competition policy.
There has also been an attempt to construct an index for competition law regimes that can be used as an indicator of governance.
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We briefly review some of the main findings from these works.
Palim (1998) The author then discovers a nonlinear ("U-shaped") relationship between the Antitrust Law Index and GNP.
None of the empirical studies cited above have examined the effect of legal tradition on the implementation and enforcement of competition policy. In the rest of this paper we attempt to examine this issue.
Relating Legal Traditions to Competition Policy
How is competition policy related to legal traditions? We can examine this issue through the lens of existing literature on the economic impact of legal traditions that we have reviewed earlier. It is perhaps easier to focus on competition law rather than the broader concept of competition policy.
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A useful framework for analyzing the various issues involved and that is inspired by our review of the relevant literature is presented in Figure 3 .
The first component of the framework is the choice of legal tradition -either by the country of the legal origin or transplant by other countries. Broader political issues covering aspects such as separation of powers, the role of regulation vs. courts, and contract vs. property rights institutions are important. Obviously, we should expect some differences between the origin and transplant cases, 24 Here, we regard competition policy as including competition law and more: "The full range of measures that may be used to promote competitive market structures and behaviour, including but not limited to a comprehensive competition law dealing with anti-competitive practices of enterprises." (WTO, 1999) particularly when in transplant cases involving colonialized countries. We use the above framework as a guideline to empirically evaluate the links between legal tradition and competition policy. Obviously, we will not be able to do this exhaustively. In the following sections, we try examine both the qualitative and quantitative evidence on the relationship between legal tradition and competition policy.
Qualitative & Anecdotal Evidence
There are some qualitative and anecdotal evidence on the impact of legal tradition on competition law. Scholars certainly recognize the importance of legal tradition when discussing competition law but very few have articulated this as a central issue. As a result, the qualitative and anecdotal evidence is scattered and varied. We review some of such evidence in this sub-section. They range from specific discussions on competition law in a common law setting, the issue of convergence in competition law and enforcement problems across OECD countries.
Competition Law in Common Law Jurisdictions
Hylton's (2003) analyzes competition law from a common law perspective and raises several key issues relating to:
certainty of law; the relative merits of rules vs. legal standards; the process of legal evolution; and the capacity of courts to apply reasonableness standards to business practices.
Even though Hylton's discussions are one-sided in the sense of addressing only common law -it gives an insight into the type of issues that might relevant in comparing competition law in different legal traditions.
Hylton highlights the tension between the economic conception of a reasonableness inquiry and the administrative concerns of courts and enforcement agencies. The asymmetry of information between firms and courts (and enforcement agencies) makes it difficult for the latter to undertake a full assessment of the cost and benefits of a challenged practice (e.g. resale price maintenance).
One solution is to remove from the plaintiff the burden of demonstrating that the challenged practice is economically unreasonable e.g. via a per se type clause. 26 This option, however, is difficult to implement in common law countries because the common law process relies on precedents that are generated over time based on equating legal validity with the notion of reasonableness. 27 In the United States, this constraint is reflected in the changes from a reasonableness-based inquiry to per-se standard and back to the reasonableness-based inquiry. These changes are also documented in Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) as well as Gifford and Kudrle (2003) .
The difficulty in reconciling economic reasonableness and legal administrative concerns also relates to the role of economic theory.
Hylton, for example, quotes Judge Breyer's opinion that reflects how law in the common law tradition is incomplete, cumulative and adaptive:
28 "For, unlike economics, law is an administrative system, the effects of which depend on the content of the rules and 26 Different terminologies are sometimes used. Per se clauses are also known as prohibitions provisions. Economic reasonableness is applied in interpreting 'rule of reason' clauses. 'Abuse principles' relate to conduct-based prohibitions that are subject to reasonableness-based inquiry. 27 Hylton (2003) Hylton (2003) analysis seems to suggest that legal tradition (e.g.
common law) has impact on the structure or content of competition policy (e.g. per se legality vs. per se illegality) and their effectiveness/impacts (e.g. errors, costs).
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Convergence of Competition Laws
There are some hints on the differences between competition laws under different legal traditions in the literature on convergence of competition laws. Gifford and Kudrle (2003) opine that convergence of the European competition law with the American competition law is constrained by history, ideology, politics and legal tradition. The authors focus on the difference between the two competition regimes in terms of substantive decisional standards (e.g. efficiency,
consumers' welfare etc.). With regards to legal tradition, the authors noted that the European competition law is largely administered in 29 Ibid, p.xv. 30 Hylton's work can also be related to Londregan (2002) who addresses the issue of ex ante predictability in the enforcement of laws in civil law and common law. Londgren discusses court predictability in the two legal traditions in the context of redistributive politics. Yet another interesting area that may be relevant is the relationship between the evolution of competition law in the U.S. and the ascendancy of the 'Chicago School of Antitrust'. the civil law tradition in which laws are set forth in legislation. This approach is more legislation-bound compared to the case in common law tradition which relies on adjudication and the precedents created.
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Hence, they argue that the European competition law is less flexible in the sense that any changes require legislative changes. 32 It is further argued that the continued divergence between the two competition laws (in terms of the substantive decision standards) is partly due to such differences in legal tradition.
Judicial Enforcement
The judiciary is an important institution in the enforcement of competition law. OECD (1997) highlights the two functions of the judiciary in the enforcement of competition law, namely: 33 ensuring that procedural due process is observed; and applying the underlying substantive principles of the competition law in a correct and consistent manner.
There are some differences in the mechanisms for judicial enforcement in countries with different legal traditions. In common law countries, the strong emphasis of the separation of powers in the constitution imply that the administration of justice is exclusively undertaken by the courts. However, constitutions under common law (e.g. Australia, Ireland) usually allows for the establishment of independent bodies (e.g. tribunals) that examine factual issues in 31 Judicial precedent does play some role in the interpretation of competition law statutes in civil law but presumably less important than in common law jurisdictions. 32 This same aspect (of flexibility) appears in the law and finance theory's discussions on the civil law and common law. 
Preliminary Quantitative Evidence
There is very little secondary data available for a cross-country analysis of competition regimes. The available data is also subject to debates in terms of their appropriateness and quality. Despite such weaknesses, we still should attempt to begin some form of quantitative analysis of the impact of legal tradition on competition law. In this section we explore such relationships empirically using some of the available data.
(a) Competition Law Implementation and Legal Tradition
We run three simple logit regressions to find out if the implementation of law is influenced by gross national income (GNI)
34 OECD(1997 ),pp.51-53. 35 OECD (1997 per capita and legal tradition. The data for GNI per capita comes from World Bank (2004) while the definition of legal tradition is also from the same source. Table 4 summarize our regression results.
GNI per capita is a significant determinant of the implementation of competition law. This is consistent with existing results such as Palim (1998) . However, legal tradition does not seem to be a significant determinant of the implementation of competition law.
(b) Legal Tradition and Content of Competition Law
To examine the influence of legal tradition on the content of competition law, we focus on three variations of a simple variable, namely, merger notifications. Data for pre-merger, post-merger and voluntary merger notifications comes from UNCTAD (2003). Table 5 summarize our results. Interestingly, Legal tradition may be influential only in case of pre-notification mergers. The odds-ratio (not reported here) indicates that switching from a English common law to German common law doubles the probability of implementing pre-merger notification.
(c) Legal Tradition and Structure of Competition Agencies
We examine to variables that highlight the structure of competition agencies, namely the length of the head of agency's appointment and the political appointments in the agencies. The data come from Global Competition Review (2003a). The regression results are summarized in Table 6 and Table 7 . Legal tradition does not seem to have any influence on either of these variables. quantitative studies has been due to data constraints, resulting in poor proxies and measures and small sample. 36 For example, Tirole (1999) argues that proper legal enforcement of contract can enhance competition either: (a) Directly e.g. market entry is encouraged when ability to enforce contracts make it easier for firms to vertically disintegrate or outsource; (b) Indirectly e.g. new or young firms can borrow more and at more favourable terms when creditors' and shareholders' interests are legally protected (similar to the law and finance literature).
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